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1 Introduction
This paper presents a laboratory experiment that investigates the role of
long-term contracts with and without memory in a repeated hidden action
framework.1 In a pioneering article, Rogerson (1985) analyzed a two-period
moral hazard problem and showed that in an optimal long-term contract, the
second-period incentives depend on the first-period outcome (i.e., the contract
exhibits memory), even though the periods are technologically independent.
While Rogerson’s result was driven by the consumption-smoothing motive
of agents,2 similar findings can also be obtained in frameworks in which this
motive is absent, so that memory in the optimal long-term contract is due to
incentive considerations only. Specifically, consider the following problem.
There are two players, a principal and an agent. In period  ∈ {1 2}, the
agent chooses an unobservable effort level  ∈ {0 1}. The agent’s effort costs
are given by 20. If the agent chooses  = 1, then the outcome of period 
will be a success. If the agent shirks (i.e., chooses  = 0), then the outcome
of period  will be either a success or a failure, each with probability 12. In
case of a success, the principal’s return in period  is given by 70, otherwise
it is zero.
outcome
period 1
outcome
period 2
wage scheme 
∈ {25 30 35 40}
wage scheme 
∈ {50 60 70 80}
failure failure 0 0
success failure  0
failure success  0
success success 2 
Table 1. The principal can choose one of the four type- wage schemes (con-
tracts without memory) or one of the four type- wage schemes (contracts
with memory).
1For surveys on the theory of repeated moral hazard, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
ch. 10), Chiappori et al. (1994), and Laffont and Martimort (2002, ch. 8).
2Cf. Fudenberg, Holmström, and Milgrom (1990), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988),
and Rey and Salanié (1990).
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Before the first period starts, the principal chooses one of the eight wage
schemes shown in Table 1. There are two different types of wage schemes.
According to a type- wage scheme, the agent gets a payment  in each
period in which there is a success and zero otherwise. Hence, type- wage
schemes are contracts without memory. In contrast, in a type- wage scheme,
the agent gets a payment  if and only if both periods were successful,
otherwise the payment is zero. Thus, type- wage schemes are contracts
with memory.
The contract-theoretic analysis under standard assumptions (i.e., common
knowledge of rationality, self-interested and risk-neutral preferences) is as
follows. If the principal chooses a type- wage scheme, the agent will exert
high effort in period  whenever  − 20 ≥ 2. Hence, the agent is willing
to choose high effort whenever the principal has set  ≥ 40, otherwise the
agent will shirk.3 The best admissible type- contract for the principal is
thus  = 40, leading to the profit 140 − 80 = 60.4 Now consider a type-
wage scheme. The agent will shirk in the second period if the first period was
a failure. Yet, if the first period was a success, the agent chooses high second-
period effort whenever  − 20 ≥ 2, which is the case for all admissible
values of . The agent thus chooses high effort in the first period whenever
 − 40 ≥ ( − 20)2. Thus, the agent is willing to exert high effort in the
first period if and only if the principal has set  ≥ 60, otherwise the agent
will shirk in the first period. The best type- contract for the principal is
 = 60, leading to the profit 140− 60 = 80.5 Overall, the principal clearly
prefers to offer the optimal contract with memory,  = 60. Table 2 shows
the agent’s optimal effort levels and both players’ expected profits for each
wage scheme that the principal can offer.
3In contract theory it is usually assumed that an agent exerts high effort when the
incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality. Note that if in the present context
the agent were slightly risk averse, he would unambiguously prefer high effort when  = 40.
4If the principal implemented low effort, she would set  = 25 and her expected profit
would be 45 only (note that she would prefer to implement low effort and make the expected
profit 70 if a zero bonus were admissible).
5Indeed, if the principal implemented low effort in the first stage by setting  = 50,
her expected profit would be (140− 50)2 + 704 = 625 only.
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wage optimal optimal second-period effort expected profit
scheme first-period effort first-period failure first-period success agent principal
 = 25 0 0 0 25 45
 = 30 0 0 0 30 40
 = 35 0 0 0 35 35
 = 40 1 1 1 40 60
 = 50 0 0 1 15 625
 = 60 1 1 1 20 80
 = 70 1 1 1 30 70
 = 80 1 1 1 40 60
Table 2. Optimal effort levels and expected profits.
Guided by the contract-theoretic analysis, our predictions are as follows.
(1a) Principals should make larger profits with a memory contract offering
 than with a no-memory contract offering  = 2, and (1b) hence
they should prefer type- wage schemes. Moreover, (2a) principals should
make the largest profit when  = 60 and (2b) hence prefer to offer this
wage scheme. Furthermore, (3) given type- contracts, agents should exert
considerably more effort (in both periods) when  = 40 than when  is
smaller. Finally, given type- contracts, (4) agents should exert considerably
less first-period effort when  = 50 than when  is larger, and (5) they
should exert much more second-period effort following a first-period success
than following a first-period failure.
Our example captures the main features of the more general framework
investigated by Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012). In particular, also when effort
is a continuous variable, renegotiation cannot be ruled out, and the only
restriction put on the admissible contract space is limited liability (cf. Innes,
1990; Pitchford, 1998), the principal’s optimal contract typically exhibits
memory,6 despite the fact that the periods are technologically unrelated.7
6In the present example, note that the optimal contract ( = 60) is renegotiation-
proof. After a first-period success the agent would not accept a wage cut, while after a
first-period failure, the principal would not be willing to implement high effort.
7See Schmitz (2005) for the case in which the periods are technologically related.
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2 The Experiment
2.1 Design
We have tested the contract-theoretic predictions in an experiment which was
conducted at the Cologne Laboratory of Economic Research.8 At the begin-
ning of the experiment, the subjects were randomly assigned to the roles of
principals (employers) and agents (employees). Each principal was randomly
and anonymously matched with one agent. We implemented a one-shot design
to prevent reputation effects and to ensure a large number of independent ob-
servations. Altogether 358 students of the University of Cologne participated
in the 12 sessions of the experiment. Each session took about 45 minutes. At
the end of the experiment the subjects answered a questionnaire containing
open questions where they could explain their decisions as well as questions
regarding risk attitudes and demographic details. We used the fictitious cur-
rency “taler,” which were later converted into euro. On average, the subjects
earned 915 euro.
2.2 The main results
Table 3 shows the behavior of the principals. In line with prediction (1a), pair-
wise comparisons of wage schemes  with the corresponding wage schemes
 = 2 show that the principals make much larger profits when they offer
type- contracts. The differences were statistically significant in three of the
four comparisons.9
Note that if the principals trusted the agents to exert high effort, they
should be indifferent between wage schemes  and  = 2. Indeed, choos-
ing a type- wage scheme might even be interpreted as an unfriendly sig-
nal of distrust by the agent, which might lead him to punish the principal
8We used the online recruitment system by Greiner (2004) for the recruitment of the
players. The experiment was programmed using the experimental software z-tree by Fis-
chbacher (2007).
9The -values are  = 0054 for a comparison of  = 30 with  = 60,  = 0000 for
 = 35 versus  = 70, and  = 0045 for  = 40 versus  = 80, according to two-sided
Mann-Whitney U tests.
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by exerting low effort, so that the principal’s profit would be smaller with
type- wage schemes. But the results show that in most cases, the standard
contract-theoretic reasoning is corroborated by the data. Most principals pre-
fer to give the agent stronger incentives by choosing a multi-period contract
with memory, which lead to larger profits.
Altogether, 31% of the principals chose type- wage schemes, while 69%
chose type- wage schemes. The choices were significantly different from a
random selection ( = 0000, two-sided binomial test). Hence, the data of
our experiment support prediction (1b), stating that principals would select
type- rather than type- contracts.
wage scheme absolute frequency relative frequency average profit
 = 25 15 838% 5100
 = 30 12 670% 5667
 = 35 16 894% 3719
 = 40 13 726% 4615
 = 50 36 2011% 6556
 = 60 22 1229% 7182
 = 70 40 2235% 6825
 = 80 25 1397% 5640
Table 3. Principal’s choice of a wage scheme and the average profit of the
principal.
The average profit of the principal was highest with 7182 taler for the
wage scheme  = 60 The differences between the profits given  = 60 and
the profits given alternative wage schemes were statistically significant for
five of the seven alternatives.10 The finding that principals made the largest
profits if they selected  = 60 is in line with prediction (2a). However, as
can be seen in Table 3, only 1229% of the principals chose the wage scheme
10The -values are  = 0054 for a comparison of  = 60 with  = 30, and  = 0000
for comparisons of  = 60 with  = 35  = 40  = 70 or  = 80 according to
two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests.
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 = 60, which is the optimal contract according to standard theory. Hence,
we do not find support for prediction (2b). In fact, the modal contract was
 = 70.
Thus, while we find strong support for the contract-theoretic prediction
that the wage scheme  = 60 is the most profitable one, principals often
made more generous offers, sacrificing a part of their profit. When at the
end of the experiment the players could explain their decisions, many of the
principals claimed that offering half of the return of two successful periods
constitutes a fair offer. On the other hand, several principals made rather
small wage offers, which seem to be simple decision errors. We come back to
fairness preferences and decision errors in the following section.
wage first-period effort second-period effort
scheme first-period failure first-period success
# obs. # high average # obs. # high average # obs. # high average
 = 25 15 1 0067 8 1 0125 7 0 0
 = 30 12 2 0167 5 0 0 7 1 0143
 = 35 16 3 0188 7 3 0429 9 1 0111
 = 40 13 6 0462 3 0 0 10 7 0700
 = 50 36 10 0278 16 1 0063 20 11 0550
 = 60 22 16 0727 4 0 0 18 14 0778
 = 70 40 38 0950 2 1 0500 38 32 0842
 = 80 25 21 0840 3 0 0 22 20 0909
Table 4. Average efforts of the agents for each period.
The reactions of the agents for given wage schemes are reported in Table
4. If the agent was confronted with a type- wage scheme, chosen effort
(pooled over both periods) was significantly higher when  = 40 than when
 was smaller.11 Hence, our findings are in favor of prediction (3). Given a
11The -values are 0001, 0006, and 0030 for a comparison of  = 40 with  = 25,
 = 30, and  = 35, respectively, according to two-sided Fisher exact tests.
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type- wage scheme, the first-period effort level was significantly smaller for
 = 50 than when  was larger.12 This is in line with prediction (4).
type-A wage schemes type-B wage schemes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dummy first period success 0219 0200 2146∗∗∗ 2405∗∗∗
(0403) (0430) (0403) (0474)
age −0003 0021
(0102) (0034)
dummy female −0613 0406
(0486) (0298)
dummy field of study −0179 0065
(0502) (0332)
dummy participation −0434 −0365
6− 10 times (0527) (0370)
dummy participation −0339 0817∗∗
more than 10 times (0557) (0394)
# of safe choices (H&L) 0140 −0090
(0121) (0093)
constant −0842∗∗∗ −0878 −1335∗∗∗ −1966∗∗
(0319) (2611) (0375) (1001)
observations 50 50 113 113
(pseudo) 2 00054 00650 02677 03611
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p 0.01, ∗∗p 0.05, ∗p 0.1
Table 5. Probit regression with second-period effort as dependent variable.
The dummy variable "field of study" is 1 if the subjects were enrolled in
economics or business administration, otherwise it is 0. We measured risk
aversion by implementing the ten paired lottery choice decisions from Holt
and Laury (2002), the variable "# of safe choices (H&L)" indicating the
number of safe choices of a subject in this lottery. We also controlled for the
number of times subjects have participated in laboratory experiments before
(variables "participation"), with 0 to 5 times as the reference category.13
12The -values are  = 0001 for a comparison of  = 50 with  = 60, and  = 0000
for a comparison of  = 50 with  = 70 or  = 80 (two-sided Fisher exact tests).
13For one session (16 subjects in the role of the agent) we have no information regarding
demographics and risk attitude due to technical problems with the questionnaire. The
results of specification (1) and (3) stay qualitativly the same if we include the 16 observa-
tions.
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As can be seen in Table 4, the average effort exerted in type- wage
schemes depended on the outcome of the first period. Except for  = 70, if
the first period had been a success, the second-period effort was significantly
higher than if the first period had been a failure.14 Probit regressions show
that a success in the first period had a significant positive effect on second-
period effort for type- wage schemes, but no significant effect for type-
wage schemes (see Table 5). Hence, the agents’ second-period effort was
sensitive towards the outcome of the first period given type- wage schemes,
which corroborates prediction (5). Note that demographic factors such as
gender or age as well as the agents’ attitude towards risk have no significant
impact. Taken together, we find strong evidence for the fact that monetary
incentives matter in the way predicted by contract theory.
2.3 Social preferences and decision errors
While the main contract-theoretic hypotheses with the exception of predic-
tion (2b) were corroborated by the data, there are several deviations from
standard theory. First of all, in contrast to prediction (2b), the majority
of the principals did not choose the wage scheme  = 60, even though (as
hypothesized in prediction 2a) principals who chose this wage scheme made
the largest profit. The modal wage scheme was  = 70, so that when high
effort is exerted in both periods, the principal offers the agent to pay him half
of her returns. In the light of the vast experimental literature suggesting the
relevance of fairness considerations (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), it is thus
natural to examine the role of social preferences for the data.
Following Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) prominent model, let player ’s utility
be given by
( ) =  − max{ −  0}− max{ −  0}  6= 
where  denotes player ’s monetary payoff,  measures player ’s disutility
from disadvantageous inequality, and  measures player ’s disutility from
14The -values are  = 0004 for  = 50,  = 0010 for  = 60,  = 0004 for  = 80
(two-sided Fisher exact tests). Note that we have only two observations for a failure in the
first period if  = 70, where one agent selected 2 = 0 and the other 2 = 1.
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advantageous inequality. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that 0 ≤   1
and  ≥ .
Following the approach taken by Huck et al. (2011), we can characterize
which decisions are Fehr-Schmidt rationalizable and which decisions cannot
be explained by any values of  and  (see Appendix A for details).
Specifically, given a memoryless contract , effort in both periods must
always be low if  ∈ {25 30 35}. Now consider  = 40. In the second
period, if there was a first-period success despite low first-period effort, then
second-period effort will be high. Second-period effort in the other cases will
be equal to first-period effort, which may be either low or high.
Given a memory contract , first-period effort must be low if  = 50,
while it can be either low or high if  ∈ {60 70 80}. Given a first-period
success, second-period effort can be either low or high if  = 50, otherwise it
must be high. Given a first-period failure, second-period effort must always
be low.
Moreover, with regard to the principal’s offer, the memoryless contracts
 ∈ {35 40} and the memory contracts  ∈ {50 60 70 80} are Fehr-
Schmidt rationalizable.
Hence, a wide array of behavior can be rationalized by the Fehr-Schmidt
model. Nevertheless, there are still some deviations from standard theory in
Tables 3 and 4 that cannot be explained by social preferences. In particular,
15% of the principals chose a memoryless contract with  ≤ 30 (see Table
3). Moreover, as can be seen in Table 4, high effort was exerted in 14% of
the cases when a memoryless contract with  ≤ 35 was offered. Similarly,
in 28% of the cases when a memory contract with  = 50 was offered the
agent exerted high effort in the first period.
To capture the fact that players make decision errors, we apply the well-
known quantal response equilibrium (QRE) framework that has been devel-
oped by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).15 In particular, let  denote player
’s expected utility if he makes a decision  ∈ {1  }. Then the probability
15Specifically, we use the agent quantal response equilibrium concept as described in
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), which takes the sequential structure of the game into account.
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that he chooses decision  = ˆ is given by
ˆP
=1  .
Thus, errors are less likely when they lead to larger utility losses. When com-
puting his expected utility, the player takes into account that all decisions are
made in this way. The parameter  can be interpreted as a rationality para-
meter. If  = 0, behavior is completely random, while behavior approaches
rational choice if  becomes large. We use maximum likelihood to estimate
the parameter . Following Rogers et al. (2009), we provide two benchmarks
(see Table 6). The “random” log likelihood is a lower bound for the quality
of fit; it results from a model where all decisions are randomly taken. The
“empirical” log likelihood is the best possible fit to the aggregate data; it
results from a model that assigns to each decision its empirical frequency.
As can be seen in the second row of Table 6, the standard QRE model
in which utilities are equal to monetary payoffs leads to a fit that is sub-
stantially better than the lower bound. This observation is in line with the
fact that most of the standard contract-theoretic predictions were borne out
by the data. Yet, as can be seen in the third row, the fit can be further
improved if we replace standard utility by Fehr-Schmidt utility. Since we
estimate one Fehr-Schmidt utility function across all subjects,  now also
captures the heterogeneity of preferences.16 It is interesting to note that only
the Fehr-Schmidt parameter  (which measures advantageous inequality) is
significantly different from zero. Bellemare et al. (2008) have recently also
found that the disutility from having more can be stronger than the disutility
from having less (and the latter may even be negative, reflecting a preference
for efficiency).17
16See also Blanco et al. (2011, section 6.1), De Bruyn and Bolton (2008), and Goeree
and Holt (2000), who also use the QRE approach to estimate Fehr-Schmidt parameters.
17See also Blanco et al. (2011, section 4) for recent evidence contradicting Fehr and
Schmidt’s (1999) assumption that  ≥ . In a related study, Dannenberg et al. (2007)
have found that in their subject pool the median value of  is 0, while the median value
of  is 0375.
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random ln ln = −6204
QRE  = 0080 (0009) ln = −5688
FS-QRE
 = 0136 (0014)
 = 0009 (0050)
 = 0334 (0038)
ln = −5430
empirical ln ln = −5058
Table 6. Maximum likelihood estimations of the quantal response equilib-
rium model with standard preferences (QRE) and with Fehr-Schmidt prefer-
ences (FS-QRE). Standard errors are in parentheses.
3 Concluding remarks
We have found experimental support for the contract-theoretic insight that,
due to incentive considerations, a principal can gain from offering long-term
contracts exhibiting memory, even if the periods are technologically unre-
lated. While the agents qualitatively responded to the incentives as pre-
dicted by standard theory and the theoretically optimal contract yielded the
largest profit, most principals did not pick this contract. The deviations from
standard theory can be explained by decision errors and social preferences.
Our structural estimation of a quantal response equilibrium model with Fehr-
Schmidt preferences showed that in particular disutility from advantageous
inequality seems to be relevant in our setting.
To our knowledge, Huck et al. (2011) is the only other experiment explor-
ing the intertemporal allocation of wages. They test Lazear’s (1979) theory of
deferred compensation (i.e., wage profiles that are increasing over a worker’s
lifetime; cf. Akerlof and Katz, 1989; Lazear, 1981). While the models mo-
tivating the experiments are quite different,18 Huck et al. (2011) also find
that agents respond strongly to monetary incentives and provide support for
18In the deferred compensation model, the principal can always deduce effort from output
(so that with full commitment the first-best solution could be implemented with a Maskin
mechanism; see Maskin, 1999; Maskin and Sjöström, 2002). Moreover, the wage in a given
period does not depend on the output of that period, but the agent is dismissed with a
certain probability after a period in which he exerted low effort.
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Lazear’s idea that deferred compensation can be used to elicit effort.19
Taken together, in our view the recent findings of Huck et al. (2011) and
the results reported in the present paper suggest that more experimental work
on the incentive effects of long-term contracts guided by contract-theoretic
research might be very promising.
19Yet, in their experiment only a sizable minority of principals actually decided to make
no payment for the first period; which can be explained by social preferences and which
might also be due to the fact that the principals’ task was quite complex, as they had to
set three wages.
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Appendix A: Fehr-Schmidt preferences
We now characterize the decisions that can be rationalized by Fehr-Schmidt
utility functions.
Agent’s behavior. Suppose the principal has offered a memoryless contract .
Given high first-period effort, agent ’s second-period incentive compatibility
constraint is 2−40−max{180−4 0}−max{4−180 0} ≥ 12(2−
20−max{160−4 0}−max{4−160 0})+ 12(−20−max{90−
2 0}−max{2−90 0}). Hence, in the second period the agent chooses
high effort if  = 40 and  = 0, otherwise he chooses low effort.
Given low first-period effort and a first-period success, the agent’s second-
period incentive compatibility constraint is 2−20−max{160−4 0}−
max{4−160 0} ≥ 12(2−max{140−4 0}−max{4−140 0})+
1
2
(−max{70−2 0}−max{2−70 0}) Thus, in the second period
the agent always chooses high effort if  = 40, and low effort otherwise.
Given low first-period effort and a first-period failure, the agent’s second-
period incentive compatibility constraint reads −20−max{90−2 0}−
max{2 − 90 0} ≥ 12( − max{70 − 2 0} − max{2 − 70 0}).
Hence, if  ∈ {25 30 35} the agent chooses low effort in the second period,
while in the case  = 40 he chooses high effort if 5 − 10 ≥ 0 (which
under the Fehr-Schmidt assumptions can happen only if  = 0).
Now consider the first period. If  = 40 and  = 0, it is straightforward
to check that the agent exerts high effort in the first period. If  = 40
and   0, the first-period incentive compatibility constraint is 12( − 20−
max{90−2 0}−max{2−90 0})+ 12(2−20−max{160−4 0}−
max{4−160 0}) ≥ 14(−max{70−2 0}−max{2−70 0})+
1
2
(2 − 20 − max{160 − 4 0} − max{4 − 160 0}), which implies
that low effort is chosen in the first period. If  ∈ {25 30 35}, the right-
hand side of the first-period incentive compatibility constraint reads instead
1
2
( − max{70− 2 0}− max{2 − 70 0}) + 14(2 − max{140−
4 0}− max{4 − 140 0}), which again implies that the agent chooses
low first-period effort.
Next, suppose the principal has offered a memory contract . Given high
first-period effort, agent ’s second-period incentive compatibility constraint
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is  − 40 − max{180 − 2 0} − max{2 − 180 0} ≥ 12( − 20 −
max{160 − 2 0} − max{2 − 160 0}) + 12(−20 − 90). Hence, if
 ∈ {60 70 80}, the agent always chooses high second-period effort. If
 = 50, he chooses high effort whenever  ≤ 1.
Given low first-period effort and a first-period success, the second-period
incentive compatibility constraint reads  − 20 − max{160 − 2 0} −
max{2−160 0} ≥ 12(−max{140−2 0}−max{2−140 0})+
1
2
(0− 70).Thus, the second-period behavior of the agent is the same as in
the case in which first-period effort was high.
Given low first-period effort and a first-period failure, the second-period
incentive compatibility constraint is −20−90 ≥ 12(0−70), so that second-
period effort will always be low.
If  ∈ {60 70 80} or if  = 50 and  ≤ 1, the first-period incentive
compatibility constraint is  − 40 − max{180 − 2 0} − max{2 −
180 0} ≥ 1
2
(−20−max{160−2 0}−max{2−160 0})+14(0−70).
If  = 50 and   1, the constraint is 12( − 20− max{160− 2 0}−
max{2 − 160 0}) + 12(−20 − 90) ≥ 14( − max{140 − 2 0} −
max{2 − 140 0}) + 12(0− 70). Thus, if  = 50, first-period effort will
be low. If  = 60, 70, or 80, first-period effort is low if   0, 25, or 4,
respectively, otherwise first-period effort is high.
Principal’s behavior. If  ∈ {25 30 35}, then principal ’s expected utility
is 1
4
(140 − 2 − max{4 − 140 0} − max{140 − 4 0}) + 12(70 −
 − max{2 − 70 0} − max{70 − 2 0}). Suppose the principal
believes that  = 0. Then her expected utility is 140− 2 −  max{4 −
180 0}−max{180−4 0} if  = 40, 12(140−− max{2−160 0}−
max{160−2 0})+ 14(70−70) if  = 50, and 140−−max{2−
180 0}− max{180− 2 0} if  ∈ {60 70 80}. Hence, the principal sets
 = 60 if  ≤ 12 and  = 40 or  = 80 otherwise. In what follows,
we consider   0, so that the principal’s expected utility is 12(140− 80) +
1
4
(70 − 40 − 10) if  = 40. Specifically, suppose the principal believes
that 0   ≤ 25. Then her expected utility is 12(140−  − max{2 −
160 0} −  max{160 − 2 0}) + 14(70 − 70) if  ∈ {50 60} and 140 −
 −  max{2 − 180 0} − max{180 − 2 0} if  ∈ {70 80}. Thus,
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she will set  = 70 if  ≤ 12 and  = 80 otherwise. Next, suppose the
principal believes that 25   ≤ 1. Then her expected utility is 12(140 −
 − max{2 − 160 0} −  max{160 − 2 0}) + 14(70 − 70) if  ∈
{50 60 70} and 140−80−20 if  = 80. Hence, the principal sets  = 50
if  ≤ 111 and  = 80 otherwise. Suppose now the principal believes that
1   ≤ 4. Then her expected utility is 14(90 − 40) + 12(70 − 70) if
 = 50, otherwise her expected utility is as in the previous case, and thus
the principal sets  = 80. Finally, suppose that the principal believes that
  4 Then her expected utility is 14(90− 40) + 12(70− 70) if  = 50
and 1
2
(140−−max{2−160 0}−max{160−2 0})+ 14(70−70)
if  ∈ {60 70 80}. Hence, in this case the principal sets  = 60 if  ≤ 12
and  = 80 if 12   ≤ min{17 + 47  57}, while otherwise she sets  = 40
if  ≤ 1, and  = 35 if   1.
Appendix B: Instructions and quiz
Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision-making. All decisions
are anonymous, that means that none of the other participants learns the identity
of someone having made a certain decision. The payoffs are also anonymous; none
of the participants learns how much the others have earned. Please read these
instructions carefully.
If you have any questions please look again at the instructions. If you still have
questions please give us a signal by raising your hand.
Overview
In this experiment you and another participant who is chosen by a random genera-
tor are assigned to one group. Each group consists of an employer and an employee.
At the beginning you are informed whether the role of the employer or the role of
the employee has been assigned to you.
All of the payments occurring in the experiment are calculated in a fictitious
currency called taler. Your payoff will be converted into euro at the end of the
experiment. The exchange rate is 7 taler for one euro.
First, the employer chooses a wage scheme. After that, there are two periods.
In each period the employee makes a decision that affects whether the group is in
State X or Y. If the group is in State X, the employer receives a return of 70 taler
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from which he will make a previously fixed wage payment to the employee. If the
group is in State Y, the employer receives zero taler and the employee does not
receive any payment.
Choice of the wage scheme
The employer can choose between different wage schemes. If he chooses a wage
scheme of type A, he pays  taler to the employee in each period in which State
X is reached.
If the employer chooses a wage scheme of type B, he pays  taler to the
employee once, provided that State X is reached in both periods.
The employer determines the amount of the payment Z for each wage scheme
bindingly. He can choose from the following alternatives:
Alternative Wage scheme A
(Payment when reaching State X in the resp. period)
1  = 25 taler
2  = 30 taler
3  = 35 taler
4  = 40 taler
Wage scheme B
(Payment when reaching State X in both periods)
5  = 50 taler
6  = 60 taler
7  = 70 taler
8  = 80 taler
The employee is informed about the alternative the employer has chosen.
First period
In the first period the employee chooses between two strategies.
• If he chooses Strategy 1, State X or State Y occur with a probability of
50%, respectively. Choosing Strategy 1 does not impose any costs on the
employee.
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• If he chooses Strategy 2, State X emerges with a probability of 100%. Choos-
ing Strategy 2 costs the employee 20 taler, which will be subtracted from his
payoff.
After the employee has chosen his strategy the software determines (in case of
Strategy 1 randomly) if State X or State Y is reached in this period. Both players
are informed about the result.
Second period
In the second period the employee chooses again between Strategy 1 and Strategy 2:
• If he chooses Strategy 1, State X or State Y occur with a probability of
50%, respectively. Choosing Strategy 1 does not impose any costs on the
employee.
• If he chooses Strategy 2, State X emerges with a probability of 100%. Choos-
ing Strategy 2 costs the employee 20 taler, which will be subtracted from his
payoff.
After the employee has chosen his strategy the software determines (in case of
Strategy 1 randomly) if State X or State Y is reached in this period. Both players
are informed about the result and about the total payoffs in the experiment.
Overview of possible results and payments:
Result Employer Employee
Period 1 Period 2 Return Wage scheme A Wage scheme B
State Y State Y 0 0 0
State X State Y 70  0
State Y State X 70  0
State X State X 140 2 
Please note that the employer’s payoff is calculated from the obtained returns
minus the employee’s wage. The employee’s payoff is calculated from his wage
minus the respective costs for choosing Strategy 2 if it was chosen. Additionally,
you receive a show-up-fee of 3 euro.
Finally, we ask you to carefully answer a short questionnaire appearing on the
screen at the end of the experiment.
When all players have finished this questionnaire they will receive their payoffs.
Please stay seated at the end of the experiment until we call your cabin number.
Good luck!
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Quiz to check the understanding of the subjects before the experiment
started
• What is the return of the employer at the end of one period if the group is
in state X?
• What is the return of the employer at the end of one period if the group is
in state Y?
• If the employer selects wage scheme A, the employee receives  if
— State X has been reached in the respective period.
— State X has been reached in both periods.
• If the employer selects wage scheme B, the employee receives  if
— State X has been reached in the respective period.
— State X has been reached in both periods.
• State X is reached with a probability of 50% if
— Strategy 1 is chosen.
— Strategy 2 is chosen.
• State X is reached with a probability of 100% if
— Strategy 1 is chosen.
— Strategy 2 is chosen.
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